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COMMENTS
A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE APPLICATION
OF THE "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
STANDARD" TO THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Law Must Parallel Scientific Advancement
Science and technology are, perhaps, inextricably linked.
Advances in science are almost invariably accompanied by con-
comitant advances in technology.1 Advances in science and tech-
nology are, in turn, often accompanied by novel legal and ethical
dilemmas and concerns.2 A society, through its body of laws, must
continually strive to stay apace with human scientific and techno-
logical progress.3 The remarkable and rapid development of the
Internet,4 together with Congress' attempts to draft laws that
1. For example, James Clerk Maxwell's electromagnetic wave theory led to,
inter alia, the development of the radio; the invention of vacuum pumps led to
the development of the modern lightbulb; Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen's discovery
of x-rays in 1895 led to the use of x-rays for medical purposes; Alan Mathison
Turing's remarkable work in the field of computer theory led to the development
of the modern computer; now, the telephone (Alexander Graham Bell) and the
modern computer are used together (along with numerous other technologies) in
multiplicity to comprise the structural components of the Internet.
2. An interesting example can be found in the recent success of scientists in
their effort to clone multi-cellular organisms (remember Dolly the Sheep?). A
divisive and troubling ethical concern arises when cloning is considered in regard
to its application to humans.
3. For example, new laws were drafted to address telephone, radio, and
television technologies. Some law pertaining to television was drafted, in part,
by way of analogy to radio, based on the conceptual similarity of the two forms of
communication. Recently, Congress has, in part by way of analogy to radio and
television, attempted to develop a body of laws that will effectively address the
legal and ethical concerns that accompany the Internet.
4. The "development" of the Internet is a product of many factors, including
the number of global users, the number of computers that are "attached" to and
143
1
Lewis: A Brief Comment on the Application of the "Contemporary Community
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
appropriately address the Internet, is an on-going example of this
phenomenon.
The startling advances in science that have produced and con-
tributed to Internet-related technologies have been paralleled by
advancements in other fields of science. Recent progress in evolu-
tionary biology, for example, has revolutionized the study of
human social behavior.' This Comment sets forth the argument,
based in part upon a new scientific understanding of a narrow
range of human behavior, that the Miller v. California' "contem-
porary community standard" fails' in its application to the
Internet.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING ALL THE FACTS
A. The Metaphysicist Has No Laboratory
Carl Sagan, in his book The Demon-Haunted World s
describes a response given by the physicist Robert W. Wood to a
toast offered in celebration of physics and metaphysics. Meta-
physics, at that time, was commonly understood to refer to a
branch of learning that concerned itself mainly with a good deal of
speculation and very little, if any, experimentation or scientific
method. Sagan paraphrased Wood's response:
The physicist has an idea. The more he thinks it through, the
more sense it seems to make. He consults the scientific literature.
The more he reads, the more promising the idea becomes. Thus
prepared, he goes to the laboratory and devises an experiment to
test it. The experiment is painstaking. Many possibilities are
checked. The accuracy of measurement is refined, the error bars
reduced. He lets the chips fall where they may. He is devoted
only to what the experiment teaches. At the end of all this work,
may be used to access the Internet, the number of computers that store the
information accessed on the Internet, etc.
5. See The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of
Culture 3 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) ("With evolutionary psychology in
place, cross-connecting biology to the social sciences, it is now possible to provide
conceptually integrated analyses of specific questions: analyses that move step
by step, integrating evolutionary biology with psychology, and psychology with
social and cultural phenomena ... .
6. 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
7. The analogy that fails is between the community contemplated by the
Miller v. California "contemporary community standard" and the "Internet
community".
8. Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle In the Dark,
37 (1996).
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through careful experimentation, the idea is found to be worth-
less. So the physicist discards it, frees his mind from the clutter of
error, and moves on to something else.
The difference between physics and metaphysics.., is not that the
practitioners of one are smarter than the practitioners of the
other. The difference is that the metaphysicist has no laboratory. 9
B. My Father's Lesson
My father was for a brief period a commissioner in the rural
North Carolina mountain county in which I was reared. The econ-
omy of the county was experiencing a good deal of growth, and the
political leaders were confronted with many issues that were diffi-
cult to resolve. I was old enough at the time to understand the
significance of the negative commentaries and occasional unflat-
tering reports that appeared in our town's biweekly newspaper in
regard to my father's sometimes unpopular stances on various
political issues. My older sister and I would periodically review
the paper just before dinner in an attempt to amass ammunition
with which to blast my father while he attempted to enjoy his
meal at the end of a long work day. We did this in subtle and
passive revenge for the shadow of negative popularity we
imagined was cast upon us by our less than brilliant father.
The onslaught would begin: "Dad . .. what were you think-
ing?" He would smile slightly, and without response would con-
tinue eating while he was bombarded with verbatim
recapitulations of the opinions my sister and I had found in the
newspaper and adopted as our own viewpoint in a matter of
moments. She and I could not be blamed; after all, the viewpoints
expressed in the paper were often highly intuitive and appealing
on an emotional, rather than cognitive, level. After several "your
food is going to get cold" admonishments from my mother, it was
my father's turn to respond.
He would put his fork down deliberately, take his napkin out
of his lap, slowly wipe his mouth, fold his napkin neatly, put it
back into his lap, and engage us with a level stare before even
saying a word. He enjoyed this period of utter silence and sus-
pense-I suppose he used this few seconds to think about what he
was going to say. He would raise his left hand, elbow still touch-
ing the table, and extend his index finger to indicate that he was
about to begin. He always spoke carefully, and his words were
9. Id.
1999] 145
3
Lewis: A Brief Comment on the Application of the "Contemporary Community
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
heavy with contemplation. "Yes," he would say, "that may be true.
But what you have failed to consider is ...."
What I learned from my father consisted of two parts. First,
he taught me that before one could honestly arrive at and adopt a
particular belief or understanding in regard to a particular sub-
ject, one had to consider and carefully weigh all the relevant facts.
Second, he taught me that all the relevant facts do not already
exist as part of one's own intuition. Instead, a great deal of open-
minded research was necessary to gather and assemble the facts.
I have since learned that this system of scrutiny is invaluable if
one plans to make a sincere attempt to discern an objective reality
from the abundance of specious, spurious, and misleading infor-
mation that is sure to exist on any subject.
III. MORALITY AND BIOLOGY CONSIDERED
A. Are We Thinking Clearly?
It cannot be disputed that issues in regard to sex and moral-
ity, at least in some cultures, may engender strong emotional
responses in those persons who consider such issues."° It is also
clear that emotional thinkers are not always logical thinkers.
Indeed, an emotional reaction to a question or issue may occasion-
ally produce a "right" answer, but it will seldom produce a well-
considered answer. More often, issues that are addressed emo-
tionally, rather than cognitively, "arise[ ] subjectively rather than
through conscious effort"," and are likely to express a personal
bias developed at least in part through personal experience.' 2
Judges, and certainly juries, are not immune from this process of
10. See generally Reay Tannahill, Sex in History 388-422 (2d ed., Scarborough
House Publishers 1992) (1980) (providing, inter alia, an overview of the social
perception of sex throughout history).
11. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1992)
(from the definition of "emotion").
12. Consider, for example, the Salem Witch Trials, which clearly reflected
(among other things) the strongly intuitive, yet bizarre and wholly unfounded
belief by many people that their neighbors were capable of flight unassisted by
machinery. Consider also the intuitive belief, based largely on basic human
chauvinism, of the Roman Catholic Church (circa the 16th century), in a
geocentric model of the universe. These were clearly emotionally-laden issues.
Without a doubt, little (if any) logical analysis or scientific method was employed
by the persons effectuating the punishments in either of the above examples.
This lack of willingness to rationally consider the relevant data in these cases
came at a tremendous cost. I concede these are examples of drastic irrationality
that are not prevalent in our legal system, but I submit that the process of
146 [Vol. 22:143
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obscuring truth or clouding objective reality by virtue of personal
biases rooted in an emotional response to an issue. 13 This seems
to be especially true in regard to issues related to human sexual-
ity,14 when we are especially subject to emotional vagaries and
moral predisposition. When this occurs, logic, pragmatism, and
detached consideration are replaced with subjective reactionism. 15
B. Our Biological Heritage16
"No serious student of human behavior denies the potent
influence of evolved biology upon our cultural lives. Our struggle
is to figure out how biology affects us, not whether it does."' 7
According to one scientist, single-celled organisms first
engaged in sexual reproduction (as opposed to "asexual", meaning
reproduction by a single organism by itself, such as is done by
amoebae) just short of a billion years ago.18 Clearly, it is under-
stating the case a bit to say that many acts of reproduction have
emotional thought obscuring logical consideration is more common than we
would like to admit.
13. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 2 (1992) (stating in regard to Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 50 U.S. 560 (1991): "It will be apparent to anyone who takes
the trouble to read these opinions that nudity and the erotic are emotional topics
even to middle-aged and elderly judges and also that the dominant judicial, and I
would say legal, attitude toward the study of sex is that 'I know what I like' and
therefore research is superfluous.").
14. I include in this category issues relating to obscenity, pornography,
human sexual relations, etc. The issues dealt with herein do not apply to any
aspect of child pornography.
15. "Subjective reactionism" may be defined as a type of mental process that
occurs when one experiences a sudden emotional reaction to a particular
stimulus.
16. This section heading is not intended to relate to or detract in any way
from possible religious theories. See Stephen Jay Gould, Dorothy, It's Really Oz,
Time, Aug. 23, 1999, at 59 ("No scientific theory . . .can pose any threat to
religion-for these two great tools of human understanding operate in
complementary (not contrary) fashion in their totally separate realms: science as
an inquiry about the factual state of the natural world, religion as a search for
spiritual meaning and ethical values.").
17. William F. Allman, The Stone Age Present 25 (1994) (quoting Steven Jay
Gould, Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology and Professor of Geology at
Harvard University).
18. Robert Jay Russell, Ph.D., The Lemurs' Legacy: The Evolution of Power,
Sex, and Love 60 (1993) ("About 900 million years ago, a mutation in a puddle-
dwelling population of single-celled creatures introduced a radical new method of
producing offspring. Instead of merely dividing in two, two different, individual
cells joined briefly to share their genetic material before dividing.").
1999]
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taken place since that time. It is likely that between 100,000 and
200,000 generations of our ancestors have been the product of
reproduction (and reproduced themselves) since the time of Aus-
tralopithecus anamensis, one of Homo sapiens' earliest ances-
tors.19 It is at least arguable that none of the sexual activity that
occurred during most of that period (i.e., until recently) could be
described as the product of immoral, prurient, or lascivious ten-
dencies.2 ° The reason: modern Homo sapiens continue the sexual
practices that brought our species to this point in time.21 It was
only with the advent of sexual mores22 in society that a division
(not a bright line) developed between what was considered "nor-
mal" behavior and what was believed to be "deviant". Only with
the emergence of sexual mores did society begin to categorize dif-
ferent sexually-related behaviors into what was thought to be
"morally good" and that which was "morally bad".23 Is it likely
that sexual behavior of the type proscribed in some western socie-
ties began contemporaneously with the creation and development
of modern sexual mores, or did the creation of modern sexual
mores classify behavior that had long been a part of our
physiology?
I assert that the latter is true: Homo sapiens, like Homo
neanderthalensis and Homo erectus, our evolutionary predeces-
sors, engaged in sexual behavior due to an instinct that provided
arguably the fundamental ingredient necessary for our perpetua-
tion as a species. 24 This does not imply, however, that the orga-
19. Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary
Psychology 26 (1994).
20. In fact, the better approach is to describe human sexual behavior in
biological terms. For example, "sex hormones can activate sex behaviors, partly
by facilitating activity in the medial preoptic area and other parts of the
hypothalamus. Dopamine acts at D1 receptors to increase sexual arousal and at
D2 receptors to stimulate orgasm. Interference with dopamine synapses
suppresses sexual behavior . . ." and so on. James W. Kalat, Biological
Psychology 312 (6th ed. 1998).
21. See Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works 471-72 (1997) ("In foraging
cultures, young men make charcoal drawings of breasts and vulvas on rock
overhangs, carve them on tree trunks, and scratch them in the sand.").
22. See generally Posner, supra note 13, at 37-69 (providing a summary of the
development and evolution of sexual mores throughout history).
23. Admittedly, this is a gross oversimplification of what was in fact a very
complex process that evolved with vast differences across many different
cultures.
24. See Carl Sagan & Ann Druyan, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 142-155
(1992) ("[T]he advantages that sex confers on future generations seem to be so
[Vol. 22:143
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nisms that engaged in sexual behavior understood reproduction to
be the sole purpose of sexual activity.25 On the contrary, biology
indicates that sexual activity and the birth of offspring may not
have been causally associated by our earthly predecessors until
relatively recently in human evolution.2 6 Consider "the Trobriand
Islanders, who.., hadn't grasped the connection between sex and
childbirth but, nonetheless, had managed to keep reproducing. "27
If the purpose of sexual activity, as viewed by our ancestors, was
not to reproduce, what was the purpose?28 "[Natural selection's
primary means of getting us to reproduce has [not] been to instill
in us an overwhelming conscious desire to have children. We are
designed [biologically] to love sex and then to love the conse-
quences that materialize nine months later-not necessarily to
great that, provided the costs were not too high, selection for improved sexual
hardware must soon have been up and running, along with whatever new
software was required to stiffen a resolve for sexual congress". See also, Allman,
supra note 17, at 111 ("[Nlew research by evolutionary psychologists reveals that
our most fundamental sexual behaviors have been shaped by the constant
negotiation and renegotiation of the different evolutionary goals and desires of
males and females. It is a battle that has raged for millennia .... The debate
over everyday sexual behaviors involving marriage rights, sexual mores, double
standards, jealousy.., and control over a woman's reproduction may seem to be
modern-day phenomena, but all these behaviors have a deep-seated,
evolutionary legacy that stretches back to the time of our ancient ancestors.").
25. Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 345 (1995) ("Human beings reached
their present state of biological development before they understood the
mechanics of reproduction. Selection was therefore in favor not of reproductive
activity per se but of sexual activity and some affection and caring for
offspring.").
26. Wright, supra note 19, at 388.
27. Id. See also, James W. Kalat, Biological Psychology 312 (6th ed. 1998)
("[In most cases the motivation for the sex act is simply that it feels good.... [A]
mother rat licks her babies all over shortly after their birth, providing them with
stimulation that is essential for their survival. But the mother presumably does
not know the value of the licking for the young; she licks them because she craves
the salty taste of the fluid that covers them. She licks them much less if she has
access to other salty fluids .... In short, animals need not understand the
ultimate function of their reproductive behaviors; they have evolved mechanisms
that cause them to enjoy and therefore perform those acts.").
28. In 1999, is reproduction the primary "purpose" of sexual behavior? If we,
as self-consciously aware organisms, able to causally connect remote events, still
do not view (with a few possible exceptions) reproduction as the sole reason for
sexual behavior, is it plausible to suggest that one million years ago the situation
was different?
1999]
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anticipate loving the consequences."29 Without a dominant sexual
impulse, 30 our species would not have survived the four million-
year period of human ancestry evidenced by fossil record. 31 Can it
be seriously argued that sexual impulses are not a powerful, and
perhaps predominant, part of our biology?
C. Does An Understanding of Human Biology Exist in the
Law?
Evidence of an understanding of our vast biological heritage,
and the scientific theory that accompanies it, has not often sur-
faced in the law, even at its highest levels.32 A failure to appreci-
ate and apply such an understanding is pronounced in cases in
which sexually related topics are being addressed. Consider, for
example, Justice Brennan's opinion in Roth v. United States, 3 one
of the first cases to address obscenity laws, in which he describes
sex as "a great and mysterious motive force in human life [which]
has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
29. Wright, supra note 19, at 388 (emphasis added). See also Posner, supra
note 13, at 3 (providing an overview for an economic theory of sexuality, and
noting that "sexual desire, including gender preference, is rooted in our biological
nature... ."); Pinker, supra note 21, at 44 ("Sexual desire is not people's strategy
to propagate their genes. [It is] people's strategy to attain the pleasures of sex,
and the pleasures of sex are the genes' strategy to propagate themselves.").
30. See Pinker, supra note 21, at 471-72. Pinker, director of the Center for
Cognitive Neuroscience at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, states:
"the male sexual mind is... easily aroused by a possible sex partner-indeed, by
the faintest hint of a possible sex partner .... The male of the human species is
aroused by the sight of a nude woman, not only in the flesh but in movies,
photographs, drawings, postcards, dolls, and bit-mapped cathode-ray-tube
displays."
31. Posner, supra note 13, at 89 ("[Slexual reproduction increases the
probability that a species will survive.").
32. See Stephen Jay Gould, Justice Scalia's Misunderstanding, in Bully for
Brontosaurus 448-460 (1991) (arguing that Justice Scalia, in Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), incorrectly defined evolution as "the search for
life's origin-and nothing more", when in fact "[e]volution is not the study of life's
ultimate origin as a path toward discerning its deepest meaning. Evolution, in
fact, is not the study of origins at all."; and noting that "Scalia's recent dissent in
the Louisiana 'creation science' case rests upon his error in discussing the
character of evolutionary arguments .... [T]he dissenting argument rests, in
large part, upon a misunderstanding of science.").
33. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth was a seller of books, magazines, and
photographs. On the trial court level, he was convicted by a jury of mailing
"obscene circulars" and an "obscene book". The Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.
150 [Vol. 22:143
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through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest
and public concern."34 Although it is little more than a philosophi-
cal aside, Brennan's divagation paints a picture of the ideological
springboard from which the Court leapt in assessing the constitu-
tionality of laws proscribing obscenity. In an attempt to disambig-
uate the term "obscenity", the Court tellingly describes obscene
material as "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest."3 5 "Prurient interest" is thus defined as "'a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion' "6 On the
trial court level, the judge in Roth gave the following jury instruc-
tion: "The words 'obscene, lewd and lascivious' as used in the law,
signify that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impu-
rity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."3' The Supreme
Court found this instruction appropriate.3 Chief Justice Warren
argued that the petitioners were "plainly engaged in the commer-
cial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials
with prurient effect."39 The Court's stance in Roth, while repre-
senting perhaps the viewpoints of many, reveals a rather base
understanding of human sexuality. The Court seems to suggest
that sex is a "particularly dangerous instinct, in need of careful
control (if not repression)."4" There is little question that the
Court has applied, at least in cases relating to obscenity law,41 a
moral standard in assessing laws that address sexual behavior, as
opposed to a standard that appropriately considers our biological
heritage. This is not really all that surprising, given that to this
day, the teaching of evolutionary biology has been suppressed in
the United States.42 Yet, the legal profession is among the most
34. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 487.
36. Id. at 488 n.20 (the Court, in a footnote, quoting the Model Penal Code
definition of "prurient interest") (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 492.
39. Id. at 497 (Warren continued: "I believe that the State and Federal
Governments can constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that these
cases present to us, and that is all we need to decide.").
40. Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 131 (1998) (noting that "[1]ike the
drug dealer, the Court seems to think, the seller of obscene works is triggering a
response which his customers cannot fully control and which will undermine
their ability to function as responsible members of the community.").
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1975), et al.
42. See Sagan, supra note 8, at 263 ("Under the guise of 'creationism,' a
serious effort continues to be made to prevent evolutionary theory-the most
1511999]
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learned of all professions. Indeed, the most considered, prag-
matic, and analytical persons belong to the legal profession. If we,
as members of the legal profession, readily employ moral and emo-
tional responses or judgment in lieu of a detached consideration of
sexual issues in light of established biological principles - princi-
ples that are "as well confirmed as anything we know-surely as
well as the earth's shape and position"43 - it is likely that the juror
will also fail in this respect. The average juror is likely to utilize
only the most rudimentary of tools-tools that have their genesis
in our collective morality and are fueled by emotional reaction-in
discerning what is sexually acceptable behavior, and what is
shameful and should be punished. Remarkably, this is exactly
what jurors are asked to do when instructed by the court to apply
the "contemporary community standard" to questions of obscenity.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNITY STANDARDS YARKSTICK
In Roth v. United States, the "contemporary community stan-
dards" test to determine whether material should be considered
obscene was given judicial approval by the Supreme Court.4" The
community standards test asks "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient inter-
est."45 It is helpful, in attempting to discern the full import of the
community standards test, to consider the trial court's jury
instruction on the community standard (with which the majority
in Roth agreed): " '[You] determine its impact upon the average
person in the community .... You may ask yourselves does it
offend the common conscience of the community by present-day
standards."46
Several years later, the Supreme Court modified and aug-
mented the obscenity standard in Memoirs v. Massachusetts." In
Memoirs, the Court enunciated a three-part test for obscenity that
powerful integrating idea in all of biology, and essential for other sciences
ranging from astronomy to anthropology-from being taught in the schools.").
See also Gould, supra note 16, at 59 ("The Kansas skirmish marks the latest
episode of a long struggle by religious Fundamentalists and their allies to restrict
or eliminate the teaching of evolution in public schools").
43. Gould, supra note 32, at 458.
44. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
45. Id. at 489.
46. Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., quoting the jury instruction given to the jury by
the trial court judge).
47. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
[Vol. 22:143
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incorporated the community standards test from Roth.48 Material
was to be considered "obscene" if it could be established that "(a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal [ed] to
a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material [was] patently offensive
because it affront[ed] contemporary community standards relat-
ing to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material [was] utterly without redeeming social value."49
The Supreme Court, six years after Memoirs, further modified
this tripartite test for obscenity in Miller v. California ,50 a case in
which the defendant was convicted at the trial court level of mail-
ing unsolicited material that a jury found to be "obscene." The
Miller test states:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.51
The Court chose to abrogate the "utterly without redeeming
social value" component of Memoirs,52 and added that sexually
explicit material might avoid being defined as obscene if it con-
tained "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."53
The Miller v. California test for obscenity found application in
Jenkins v. State of Georgia. A Jenkins was convicted in a jury trial
for the distribution of "obscene" material.5 The crime: showing
the movie Carnal Knowledge in an Albany theater.5 6 In reversing
48. Id. at 418.
49. Id.
50. 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
51. Id. at 24 (Burger, C.J., quoting in part Roth, 354 U.S. at 489) (citation
omitted).
52. Id. at 24-25 ("We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly
without redeeming social value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, (citation
omitted); that concept has never commanded adherence of more than three
Justices at one time.").
53. Id. at 24 (emphasis added) ("At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive
depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.").
54. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
55. Id. at 154.
56. Id. at 154. (Carnal Knowledge was directed by Mike Nichols, director of,
inter alia, The Graduate, Regarding Henry, The Birdcage, and Primary Colors.
The movie starred Jack Nicholson, Candice Bergen, Art Garfunkel, Ann-Margret
1999] 153
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the conviction, the Supreme Court further defined the periphery of
the contemporary community standard set forth in Miller. 7 The
Court held that "the Constitution does not require that juries be
instructed in state obscenity cases to apply the standards of a
hypothetical statewide community .... Miller held that it was
constitutionally permissible to permit juries to rely on the under-
standing of the community from which they came .... "58
In Smith v. United States, in regard to a conviction under a
federal statute that proscribed the mailing of obscene materials,
the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e must decide whether the jury is
entitled to rely on its own knowledge of community standards, or
whether a state legislature (or a smaller legislative body) may
declare what the community standards shall be . . "'0 Quoting
Hamling v. United States,61 the Court reiterated its position that
community standards should be derived from what the juror per-
ceives is the community standard of obscenity for his or her local
community: "A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of
the views of the average person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes ....62
Almost ten years later, in Pope v. Illinois,6" a case involving
an obscenity conviction, the Supreme Court softened the commu-
nity standard somewhat by asserting that while prurient appeal
and patent offensiveness should still be gauged by the local com-
munity yardstick, whether a work has serious value outside of any
obscenity should not.64 Justice White stated, "The proper inquiry
is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would
find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in alleg-
edly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find
(who received a Best Supporting Actress Academy Award Nomination for her
role in this movie), Rita Moreno, and Carol Kane).
57. Id. at 157.
58. Id. at 157 (The Court also stated: "What Miller makes clear is that state
juries need not be instructed to apply 'national standards'.").
59. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
60. Id. at 302.
61. 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (Hamling involved a conviction for mailing and
conspiring to mail what was purportedly an obscene brochure).
62. 431 U.S. at 302.
63. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
64. In Pope, the Court expounded on a seed first planted in Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) ("Literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
... is not discussed in terms of contemporary community standards.").
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such value in the material, taken as a whole."65 While this circum-
scription appears to allow a broader moral spectrum to be consid-
ered by a jury in its assessment of whether a particular material
is obscene, it is arguable that a typical juror's perception of his or
her local community standard will not differ dramatically if at all,
from the same juror's perception of how a hypothetical reasonable
person would view the material in question.66
That a jury must consider how a hypothetical "reasonable per-
son" would feel about a particular material seems to suggest that
the jury may receive some type of "expert" testimony in regard to
questions of value (literary, artistic, etc.). For example, a museum
curator might be allowed to introduce evidence of artistic form or
appeal in certain paintings depicting nudity or sexual acts. Or a
college English professor could provide evidence to a jury that Wil-
liam Butler Yeats' Leda and the Swan had high literary merit. It
is possible that this type of "expert" testimony may, in some rare
instances, override a jury's response to a particular material. Yet,
"because the record never discloses the obscenity standards which
the jurors actually apply, their decision in these cases are effec-
tively unreviewable . "..."67 Arguably, if a jury is sufficiently
moved by emotional response or allegiance to conventional social
values, the "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" arm of
the Miller test will have negligible impact.
The contemporary community standard, as it now exists,
requires individual jurors to make a subjective judgment in regard
to whether a particular material is obscene by applying a fictional
standard that the jurors intuitively presume corresponds to the
common conscience of the local community. The community stan-
dard appears anachronistic and profoundly antiquated when con-
sidered in regard to the advances in evolutionary biology detailed
above. This temporal infirmity becomes particularly salient in
light of another recent product of science and technology: the
Internet.
65. 481 U.S. at 500-501 (emphasis added).
66. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing at length the difficulty of applying hypothetical standards to a subject
as amorphous as obscenity).
67. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315-316 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)..
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V. A UNIQUE AND NEW MEDIUM OF
WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATION
6 8
A. What is the Internet, and How Does it Work?
The Internet is comprised of a global network to which mil-
lions of computers, at any given time, may be connected.69 It is a
world-wide system of communication that operates with no cen-
tralized point of origin or operation.7 ° Any person with a com-
puter, a modem, and the appropriate communications software
may access the Internet, and thereby send information to and
receive information from anywhere else in the world where there
exists Internet service.71 As of 1998, more than 70 million people
in the United States had used the Internet.72 Using the Internet,
one may retrieve information stored on computers throughout the
world7 3 on virtually any topic, often including text, pictures,
graphics, videos, or recordings of sounds and spoken language,
among other visual and auditory stimuli. "It is no exaggeration to
conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought., 74
B. Attempts to Regulate the Internet
In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA") which represents Title V of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. 75 The clear purpose of the Act, although the potential
effect of the statute was certainly much broader, was to eliminate
the likelihood that minors would be able to retrieve material
deemed "indecent"7 6 or "patently offensive" 77 from the Internet. 78
68. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996) ("The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication"), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
69. Id. at 830 (finding 1).
70. Id. at 832 (finding 11).
71. Id. at 832 (finding 12).
72. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa.
1999), (finding 1) pending review, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 1999).
73. Thus, a person in Buies Creek, North Carolina could access and view
documents via the Internet from computers located in New York City, Paris, or
Tierra del Fuego.
74. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (finding 74).
75. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 502, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp.
1999).
76. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (prohibiting, in effect, the knowing transmission
of obscene or indecent material to another one knows is less than 18 years old via
a telecommunications device).
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Under the "patently offensive" section of the statute, an auditory
or visual stimulus was to be "measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards."79 Almost immediately after the CDA was signed
into law by the President, a constitutional challenge to the CDA
was brought by numerous plaintiffs, including the American Civil
Liberties Union, America On-line, Inc., Apple Computer, Inc.,
CompuServe Incorporated, Microsoft Corporation, Wired Ven-
tures, Ltd., and a host of others."0 The Supreme Court, in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, found the content-based restric-
tions on speech in the CDA facially overbroad, and therefore
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.8 '
Congress' next attempt to protect minors from potentially
harmful material on the Internet, the Child Online Protection
Act 2 ("COPA"), contains provisions similar to the CDA. For
example, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) of COPA declares that
"[w]hoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World
Wide Web,8 3 makes any communication for commercial purposes
that is available to any minor and that includes material that is
harmful to minors" shall be subject to criminal and civil penalties,
including considerable fines (up to $50,000 per day of violation)
and imprisonment. "Material that is harmful to minors"8 4 is
defined as "any communication, picture, image, graphic image file,
article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is
obscene or that . . . the average person, applying contemporary
77. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (prohibiting, in effect, the knowing transmission
of patently offensive material to another one knows is less than 18 years old via a
telecommunications device).
78. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(d).
79. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (Anyone who knowingly "uses any interactive
computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication" may be subject to imprisonment or a fine).
80. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
81. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
82. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1999).
83. The World Wide Web, an informational mosaic created by computers
linked to the Internet, is perhaps the most popular and widely accessible aspect
of the Internet.
84. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6).
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community standards, would find.., is designed to appeal to...
the prurient interest".,5 The Child Online Protection Act, unlike
the Communications Decency Act, contains an additional require-
ment that a material in question "taken as a whole, lack[ ] serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" before it can be
defined as "obscene".8 6
The American Civil Liberties Union and numerous web site
operators and content providers brought an action in federal dis-
trict court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the law and have
COPA declared unconstitutional under the First and Fifth
Amendments. 7 The federal court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction. This ruling is, as of this writing,
pending review by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 8
I include in this paper information pertaining to the CDA and
COPA, not to argue in favor of or detract from these legislative
efforts, but rather to indicate the possibility that future attempts
by Congress and various state legislatures to regulate the Internet
in regard to material designed for and consumed by adults, will,
like the Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Pro-
tection Act, contain provisions dictating that obscenity or inde-
cency be judged in part on the basis of a contemporary community
standard. s9
VI. APPLICATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARD
To THE INTERNET
A. A Failure of Analogy
In Miller v. California,9" Chief Justice Burger conceded that a
"national standard" for determining what was obscene was not
possible to articulate: " 'I believe that there is no provable
85. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6)-(e)(6)(A).
86. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6)(C).
87. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa.
1999), (finding 1) pending review, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 1999).
88. Id.
89. In no way do I mean to suggest that child pornography should not be
forbidden, or that minors should have unbridled access to sexually explicit
material. I agree with the stated purpose of the Communications Decency Act
and Child Online Protection Act, in the sense that they attempt to prevent
minors from being reached by potentially harmful material. However, as the
Court noted in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), this
legislation was facially overbroad to the extent that it would have restricted or
made illegal many constitutionally protected forms of speech.
90. 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
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"national standard" . . . At all events, this Court has not been
able to enunciate one. ..."'91 Chief Justice Burger then stated, "It
is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or
New York City."92 It is implicit in this statement that what may
be legal and acceptable sexually explicit speech or behavior (such
as operating an adult video store) in Tampa, Florida may be con-
sidered shameful, and even punishable, in West Jefferson, North
Carolina.93 Although this disparate treatment across geographic
areas is somewhat disconcerting, the community standard has, no
doubt, been an attractive mechanism by which persons in a com-
munity could delimit the moral boundaries of the local adult book-
store, video store, newsstand, or dance club. Twelve people sitting
as a jury in a "representative" capacity for the community have
the paternalistic authority, in part under the mandate of the com-
munity standard, to determine that a particular work should no
longer be available for anyone in the community to read or view.
On some level this is an appealing notion to many of us. Few
of us would appreciate an adult bookstore moving in across the
street from our home. Although the community standard has
found employment in cases in which it had less than perfect appli-
cation,94 many obscenity law convictions dealt with situations
similar to that described above, in which a few persons in a local
community wielded a law proscribing obscenity to fight moral deg-
radation in the form of a newsstand selling filthy95 magazines or a
91. Id. at 32 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting)).
92. Id. at 32.
93. See Id. at 33 (The Court stated: "People in different States vary in their
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity.").
94. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (In Smith, petitioner was
convicted of mailing what the jury determined to be obscene materials) (Stevens,
J., dissenting: "In response to a request, [petitioner] mailed certain pictures and
writings from one place in Iowa to another. The transaction itself offended no
one ... and violated no Iowa law. Nevertheless, because the materials proved
'offensive' to third parties who were not intended to see them, a federal crime was
committed.").
95. "Filthy" is defined by American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (3d ed. 1992) as "disgustingly dirty". I use this word here simply
because it finds common application in state and federal obscenity statutes. See,
e.g., Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (1999).
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theater offering adult cinema.96 The underlying theory of the com-
munity standard is that people should have some control over the
type of establishments that may operate in their neighborhood.
Even though use of the community standard often results in
inconsistent prosecution of the obscenity laws, it is conceded that
allowing the voice of the community to control is a fairly strong
argument for the use of a community standard. Regardless, by
virtue of the truly unique nature of the Internet, an analogy
between the rural community and the "Internet community" can-
not be supported.
A person in any town in America or the world may, via the
Internet, access information stored on computers anywhere else in
America or the world that are connected to the Internet. For
example, a web site in Houston, Texas, which posts sexually
explicit photographs, could be viewed via the Internet by a person
in North Andover, Massachusetts or Nairobi, Kenya. This is a
very different situation from a newsstand in a small town dissemi-
nating material that could negatively influence the total morality
quotient of the town. Imagine that one person in North Andover
inadvertently comes across the Houston web site and fails to close
their Internet web browser before a shocking image appears on
the computer screen. For purposes of the community standard,
should the "community" be defined as the one person who was
offended by the Houston web site? There is certainly no reason to
believe that anyone else in that person's locale (in this example,
North Andover) was offended by the pictures posted in Houston.
Does it make sense to include in the definition of "community" the
actual geographic community of the singular offended person?
Given the truly incomprehensible number of web sites currently
available on the World Wide Web,97 and assuming that the person
accessing the offending material did not access the material on
purpose, is there any probability that this offending web site could
or would be accessed contemporaneously by anyone else in that
person's community? Or should "community" be defined as the
entire range of possible or potential receivers of any offending
information? In the face of these questions, it becomes clear that
96. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (Supreme Court reversed a
jury decision that found obscene magazines purchased from an adult bookstore);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (Supreme Court reversed a jury decision
that found a movie shown in an Albany, Georgia theater obscene).
97. It is no exaggeration that the number of web pages is currently in the
millions and is rapidly growing.
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the typical conception of "community" disappears when considered
in regard to the Internet. Given the obvious fact that an obscenity
charge cannot be based on only one person's opinion of a particu-
lar material, to punish a person for posting "offensive" material on
the Internet on the basis of the contemporary community stan-
dard-after only one person is offended by it-effectively makes
criminal the mere possibility that someone else might view the
material and find it offensive.
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno,9 a federal district
court expressed dissatisfaction with the applicability of the com-
munity standard under the Communications Decency Act.99 Sub-
sequently, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,'00 the
Supreme Court, in dictum, noted a similar concern: "[T]he 'com-
munity standards' criterion as applied to the Internet means that
any communication available to a nation-wide audience will be
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be
offended by the message."10' Yet, the federal district court openly
conceded that "the Government could punish [obscenity] on the
Internet even without the CDA"' °2 under a presently existing fed-
eral statute.10 3 The Supreme Court, in a footnote in Reno, also
indicated that "transmitting obscenity . . . whether via the
Internet or other means, is already illegal under federal law
.... ,"104 Who decides, then, in regard to the Internet, what is to be
considered obscene? Under the contemporary community stan-
dard, it is the jury.
98. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
99. Id. at 877-878 (The Court stated: "If a speaker's content is even arguably
indecent in some communities, he must assess.., the risk of prosecution and the
cost of compliance with the CDA. Because the creation and posting of a Web site
allows users anywhere in the country to see that site, many speakers will no
doubt censor their speech so that it is palatable in every community.").
100. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
101. Id. at 877-878.
102. 929 F. Supp. at 865 (The court also stated: "The Government could also
completely ban obscenity ... from the Internet. No Internet speaker has a right
to engage in [this form] of speech, and no Internet listener has a right to receive
[it].").
103. Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (1999).
104. 521 U.S. at 878 n.44 (The Court also noted: "In fact, when Congress was
considering the CDA, the Government expressed its view that the law was
unnecessary because existing laws already authorized its ongoing efforts to
prosecute obscenity . . ").
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B. The Vagaries of a Jury1°5
The freedom of Americans to read, listen, view, speak, sing, or tell
jokes should not be subject to the majority vote of anyone: not a
jury, not a legislature, not even a plebiscite of all the people. The
First Amendment is essentially an undemocratic -indeed
antidemocratic-restriction on majority power. If any Americans
wish to satisfy their intellectual, emotional, or artistic needs by
exposing themselves to expression that all other Americans
despise, that should be their right under the First Amendment. 106
1. A Question of Fact or Opinion?
There have been many instances throughout history in which
one group of people has made a choice for others on the basis of
emotional and subjective biases, beliefs, or understandings. 0 7
When this occurs, the freedom of a few is necessarily compromised
by the ad hominem conviction of those who achieve or are given
the brief authority to govern. The framers of the Constitution
were acutely aware of this danger, 0 s and consequently wrote into
the Constitution that the "Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by
Jury."0 9 The jury was to serve "first and foremost to protect the
105. Alan M. Dershowitz, First Amendment Loses in Obscenity Cases, in
Contrary to Popular Opinion 81-82 (1992) (arguing that even though 2 Live Crew
(a rap group) and the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center (displaying pictures
taken by Robert Mapplethorpe, a photographer who depicted homoeroticism in
his art) were acquitted of obscenity charges by juries, "these cases reflect a
dangerous precedent: namely, that it is constitutionally permissible to subject
controversial art to the vagaries of a jury.").
106. Id. at 81. (Dershowitz qualifies this somewhat overstated assertion in the
next paragraph, indicating that this principle of freedom does not apply to
situations in which one party is harmed by another party's assertion of his First
Amendment rights: "No American has the right to exercise freedom of speech in a
manner that directly harms another. But 'harm' does not include merely being
offended by the knowledge that someone else is enjoying art or literature that
offends you.").
107. Examples of choices made on the basis of emotion and bias include the
actions of the Roman Catholic Church in the 17'" and 18th centuries, the
suppression of Protestantism in England in the 16' century, the rise of Nazi
Germany, human slavery, racism, the repression of classic genetic theory by
Stalin and Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, and the repression of evolution and
natural selection theories in this country. All of these sad failures of humanity
were based on decisions made in the absence of logic and pragmatism.
108. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making
of the Constitution 291-303.
109. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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people against the abuse of power by an arbitrary Crown." 110 The
jury, in one capacity, can serve as a safeguard against what may
be unfair or unjust laws or actions brought against an individual
by the State. Before one may be deprived of liberty by the State,
"a jury drawn from 'the same rank as the accused"' must, in
essence, choose to enforce the law.11 Similarly, in regard to crim-
inal trials brought on the basis of laws that society universally
views as necessary,1 1 2 all jurors must agree that the defendant is
guilty before he may be divested of his liberty. The jury, function-
ing as such, represents a symbolic and functional palisade that
stands against repression and injustice imposed by the State or
Federal Government.
Paradoxically, the jury also has the potential to act as an
instrument of repression. The lines here are easily drawn. In a
typical criminal trial, (i.e., not one in which obscenity is at issue),
the jury's determination of guilt is one of fact. Juries do not, or
should not, convict on the basis of the reprehensibleness or moral
quality of the conduct. The defendant either committed the crime,
or not. The evidence presented to the jury is, in the court's careful
consideration, all the relevant data. The jury must carefully and
objectively weigh all the facts, and then arrive at a conclusion
based on this data. The results may not always be perfect; yet,
this process of discerning fact is as close to the laboratory of the
physicist as the law is likely to achieve. This process is markedly
different from that which occurs in an obscenity law prosecution,
which shares much more in common with the metaphysicist, who
has no laboratory and makes only subjective determinations, than
the physicist.
Contrary to assertions by the Supreme Court,113 a criminal
prosecution that focuses on whether a material or speech is
obscene or licentious is not a question of fact. In the absence of
any palpable standard, it can only be subjective. Justice Stevens,
110. Rakove, supra note 108, at 294 (discussing the origin of the jury system).
111. Id. at 297 (discussing the origin and evolution of the jury system).
112. For example, laws forbidding rape, murder, robbery, assault, battery, etc.
113. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1972) ("The phrasing
of the Miller test makes clear that contemporary community standards take on
meaning only when they are considered with reference to the underlying
questions of fact that must be resolved in an obscenity case. The test itself shows
that appeal to the prurient interest is one such question of fact for the jury to
resolve. The Miller opinion indicates that patent offensiveness is to be treated in
the same way.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
16319991
21
Lewis: A Brief Comment on the Application of the "Contemporary Community
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
114dissenting in Smith v. United States, argued that "[elven the
most articulate craftsman finds it easier to rely on subjective reac-
tion rather than concrete descriptive criteria as a primary defini-
tional source [for obscenity]. "15 Justice Stewart, in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, illustrating the subjective and arbitrary nature of that
which is obscene, stated, "I shall not.., attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intel-
ligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it."" 7 This is a superb
indication of exactly how a jury, applying the community stan-
dard, is likely to attempt a classification of sexually explicit mate-
rial: an abandonment of logical thought, an application of the
subjective bias of personal morality, and subsequently a failure to
apply a biological understanding of human sexuality." 8 Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Miller v. California,"9 advocated a similar
position: "Obscenity cases usually generate tremendous emotional
outbursts. They have no business being in the courts."'2 ° Can we
justify regulating Internet decency on the basis of the caprice of
the average juror in any community that potentially can receive
what may be to some-but not to others-offensive material?
Jury trials are, of course, subject in some cases to appellate
review. However, given the fact that trial records do not indicate
the obscenity standards actually applied by the jury, decisions in
obscenity cases are "effectively unreviewable.""2 l
114. Id.
115. Id. at 313.
116. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
117. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
118. See Posner, supra note 13, at 98-99 ("In dealing with a subject as central
to the survival of species as procreative and 'procreative-protective' sex, and
especially to the survival of our species-for it is the complexity of the human
organism that lies at the root of the special features of human sexuality-we
should not be surprised to find cogent explanations based on evolutionary
biology." Providing a biological unpinning of "deviant" sexual behavior, Posner
states: "These practices are not 'unnatural,' at least in a biological sense; rather
they are peripheral to procreative sexuality.") (emphasis in original).
119. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
120. Id. at 41 (Justice Douglas continued: "The Court is at large because we
deal with tastes and standards of literature. What shocks me may be sustenance
for my neighbor. What causes one person to boil up in rage over one pamphlet or
movie may reflect only his neurosis, not shared by others.").
121. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315-316 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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2. An Averaging of Morality
If a jury consisting of twelve people is asked to articulate their
attitudes toward sex-in the presence of the other jurors-is it
likely that the responses will be candid and forthright? Given the
history of sexual repression in our society, 122 it is much more prob-
able that those persons holding more liberal and more conserva-
tive attitudes will compromise their beliefs to a degree, resulting
in an averaging effect on the overall moral component of a given
jury. 123 "[Tihe expression of individual jurors' sentiments will
inevitably influence the perceptions of other jurors, particularly
those who would normally be in the minority."1 24 This process is
sure to result in an obscenity label being placed on the most
extreme manifestations of human sexuality as set forth in a par-
ticular material. This same process of shrinking the left and right
walls of the collective morality of the jury, magnified in effect by
the jury's attempt to apply the community standard of morality-
an average in itself-may likely also result in the labeling as
obscene that which is far less sexually explicit. In addition, if the
statute upon which the prosecution is based contains language
that purports to define what is to be considered "obscene" or
"patently offensive", e.g., "a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-
pubescent female breast", or "an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sex act",125 a more liberal juror who may not find the
material or speech in violation of her personal code of morality
may nonetheless be impelled to vote to convict if the statute
appears to proscribe the behavior in question.
It is manifestly illogical to apply a local community standard
to an Internet publication that potentially can reach every com-
munity in the world that has access to the Internet. Any attempt
122. Posner, supra note 13, at 15 (The "resemblance of human sexual behavior
to that of other animals [has] made sex seem to many thoughtful observers in the
Christian tradition part of our animal nature rather than part of our divine
nature: part, that is, of the declension. It is only a small step to the view that sex
is, at best, a necessary evil (necessary to the survival of the human race, and
some early Christians thought that the survival of the race was too high a price
to pay); to the correlative view that nonprocreative sex, like gluttony, is an
unqualified evil. .. ").
123. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting: "The average juror may well have one reaction to sexually oriented
materials in a completely private setting and an entirely different reaction in a
social context.").
124. Id.
125. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
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to formulate a national or international standard of obscenity
reveals that such a standard is entirely beyond definition. The
contemporary community standard, in its vacuous subjectivity,
becomes impotent in the face of science and the global society.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. The Internet as an Instrument of Freedom
"Government interference with adult consensual activities is
unjustified unless it can be shown to be necessary for the protec-
tion of the liberty or property of other persons."126
For a court, by way of a jury's application of the "community
standard", to apply to the masses, or only to a few, a morality to
which a great many people in this country do not subscribe, in
order to prevent the creation and distribution of sexually explicit
material, is "community censorship in one of its worst forms."' 27
The Internet provides every adult who chooses to do so, even those
who reside in a town that would embargo an adult bookstore or
theater, an opportunity to explore or satisfy his or her sexuality
through access to otherwise unavailable material. The Internet
provides a way for consenting adults to communicate with other
consenting adults on virtually any topic, regardless of geographi-
cal location. Such communication would be impossible, or at the
very least, greatly restricted, by the application of the arbitrary
and antiquated "community standard" that Congress has advo-
cated in its two attempts at Internet regulation (the CDA and the
COPA) thus far.
The law in regard to Internet obscenity should reflect a stan-
dard with precise definition that is applicable and understandable
by men, women, and juries. The appropriate line should be drawn
by virtue of whether a person is harmed by the manufacture, dis-
tribution, or viewing of the material in question. 12  Evidence of
harm to others is, in most cases, objectively verifiable. 29 This
standard, similar to that used in determining whether punish-
ment is warranted in other crimes, would serve to eliminate the
126. Posner, supra note 13, at 3.
127. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. If no one is harmed by the creation, distribution, and/or viewing of a
particular sexually explicit material, there is no practical justification in
forbidding such material. For Congress, the state legislatures, and the various
courts to do so is an unwarranted paternalistic expurgation.
129. The mere possibility that someone might view a particular material and
be offended by it does not qualify as a "harm".
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disparate and arbitrary application of the law across geographic
areas. Requiring a standard of evidence that is quantifiable, and
that appropriately takes account of human sexuality as now
understood by evolutionary biological science, would place the
court and jury closer to the laboratory, where a careful considera-
tion of all the data takes place, and further from the application of
the law by moral impulse and emotional reaction. For the court to
exclude the "community standard" from all future Internet
obscenity review would be an advancement in the cause of per-
sonal freedom for all Americans.
Phillip E. Lewis
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